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Why do individuals allocate attention to specific problems in organizations? Viewing
online knowledge sharing as a matching process between knowledge providers and
problems, we examine attention allocation in the context of an online community
within which knowledge providers respond to problems posted by other organization
members. We argue that knowledge providers are more likely to allocate attention to
solving problems that more closely match their expertise, but that decisions to allocate
attention are also influenced by problem characteristics such as length, breadth, and
novelty, as well as by problem crowding. Analyzing 1,251 realized matches and 12,510
nonrealized matches among knowledge providers and problems posted over a 32-
month period on an online discussion forum within a global engineering firm, we find
evidence to support our claim that attention allocation is driven by the features of
a particular provider–problem match, thereby shifting the discourse from knowledge
provider–seeker relationships to knowledge provider–problem matches. The impli-
cations for theories of knowledge sharing, matching processes, and managerial at-
tention are discussed.
In the digital economy, individuals and organi-
zations are awash with information. With more than
3.2 billion social networking users, 3.9 billion active
e-mail users, and 400 million tweets a day, the rise
of social media has generated vast amounts of in-
formation content. Businesses own more than 900
million mailboxes worldwide, which account for
more than 100 billion work-related e-mails sent
and received daily (Radicati, 2013), with the aver-
age manager spending 28% of his or her workday
sending and answering e-mails (McKinsey Global
Institute, 2012). One report on social technologies,
defined as “information technology (IT) products
and services that enable the formation and opera-
tion of online communities, where participants
have distributed access to content and distributed
rights to create, add and/or modify content”
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2012: 1), estimates that
a value of over US$1 trillion can be realized an-
nually through social technologies and that in-
dividual employee productivity can be enhanced
by 20–25%. This explosion of social technologies
has the power to transform organizations and or-
ganizational life.
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Within organizations, the critical processes of
learning, innovation, and performance increasingly
depend on how members of the organization utilize
such social technologies to share knowledge (Argote,
McEvily, & Reagans, 2003; Brown & Duguid, 2002;
Sambamurthy & Subramani, 2005). To facilitate
knowledge sharing, many large organizations have
established electronic communities of practice and
introduced social technology platforms to support
them, such as online discussion forums (or message
boards) on which employees can post problems re-
lated to their work and share solutions with each
other.1 Such platforms are potentially valuable for
knowledge sharing, but their proliferation can con-
tribute to an increasing sense of information over-
load among employees (Davenport & Beck, 2001;
Dean & Webb, 2011). In a world of information
overload, attention becomes a critical scarce resource
(Simon, 1947). Accordingly, the finite attention of
employees becomes a key constraint on problem
solving (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958;
Ocasio, 1997). Faced with a growing number of
problems seeking solutions via social technology
platforms, individuals who might be able to provide
solutions to others’ problems must decide not only
whether to allocate attention to offering solutions
at all, but also which problems to address. Since
information overload is a growing challenge, the
question of why organization members decide to
allocate attention to addressing particular prob-
lems online is an increasingly urgent concern for
organizations.
To explain why individuals choose to respond to
problems online at all, prior research on online
knowledge sharing in organizations has pointed
toward social motives such as reputation enhance-
ment, commitment to the community, and general-
ized reciprocity (e.g., Chiu, Hsu, & Wang, 2006;
Constant, Sproull, & Kiesler, 1996; Wasko & Faraj,
2000). Such benefits are particularly important be-
cause many organizations do not offer explicit
rewards or incentives for online knowledge sharing
among their employees. However, individuals are
likely to be concerned about the costs, as well as the
benefits, of spending time and effort responding to
others’ problems online, since attention is a finite
resource. Moreover, the question of which problems
individuals choose to address online has not been
addressed in prior studies. Applying findings from
research on interpersonal knowledge sharing to the
online context suggests that individuals might be
more likely to respond to problems from other
individuals with whom they have connections
based on factors such as social similarity, physical
proximity, or prior familiarity (e.g., Espinosa,
Slaughter, Kraut, & Herbsleb, 2007; Quigley, Tesluk,
Locke, & Bartol, 2007; Reagans, 2011). Yet in online
settings individuals often respond to problems
posted by others with whom they have no such
connections, to the extent that Constant and col-
leagues (1996) noted that online knowledge sharing
seems to be driven by “the kindness of strangers.”
The implication is that individuals may choose
to respond to problems for reasons beyond in-
terpersonal connections—perhaps for reasons re-
lated to the problem itself.
In this study, we examine knowledge sharing in
the context of an intraorganizational online discus-
sion forum: a social technology platform that pro-
vides an informal setting in which knowledge
seekers (that is, employees who are searching for
solutions to problems) can post task-related ques-
tions and knowledge providers (that is, employees
who can offer solutions to those problems) can post
answers. We explore why knowledge providers al-
locate attention to some problems rather than others
in this context by shifting perspectives to focus on
provider–problem matching rather than provider–
seeker relationships, and by taking into account the
costs, as well as the benefits, that these providers
can expect to incur. The context is of theoretical
relevance for our research question because there
are many problems seeking solutions, and individ-
uals decide which problems to address, if any. It is
also of practical importance since many large, dis-
persed organizations use online discussion forums
to facilitate knowledge sharing among their employ-
ees (e.g., Davenport & Prusak, 2000; Kane & Alavi,
2007). Other social technology platforms, such as e-
mail, document repositories, and groupware, are
widely used for knowledge sharing within firms too
(e.g., Ahuja & Carley, 1999; Bock, Zmud, Kim, & Lee,
2005; Kankanhalli, Tan, & Wei, 2005), but the dis-
tinctive advantages of an online discussion forum
are that knowledge seekers can search both broadly
and efficiently for solutions to their problems, and
can obtain immediate, customized responses from
knowledge providers whom they might not other-
wise reach.
In order for knowledge seekers to receive
responses, however, knowledge providers have to
1 Online discussion forums are also increasingly used to
share knowledge across and outside organizational bor-
ders (e.g., Faraj, Jarvenpaa, &Majchrzak, 2011; Jeppesen &
Lakhani, 2010).
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decide to allocate attention to addressing their
problems. Attention allocation involves the focus-
ing of time and effort on a stimulus (James, 1890;
Kahneman, 1973). While attention allocation can be
mindful or less mindful (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006;
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006), we focus on deliberate
decisions to allocate attention to solving particular
problems, as manifested by whether or not an in-
dividual posts a response to a problem in an online
discussion forum. We draw on organizational theo-
ries of matching processes (e.g., Mitsuhashi & Greve,
2009; Vissa, 2011) to analyze why individuals allo-
cate attention to some problems rather than others.
As a baseline, we propose that this matching process
will be influenced by how closely the expertise
possessed by the knowledge provider matches the
expertise required by the problem. We then consider
the effect of other problem characteristics that can
attract attention, but which also create cognitive load
for a knowledge provider, such as the problem’s
length, breadth, and novelty, as well as the effects of
problem crowding in the form of concurrently posted
problems that can attract attention to the forum, but
which also compete with the focal problem for at-
tention. Finally, we propose that expertise matching
can moderate the effects of problem characteristics
and problem crowding on a provider’s decision to
allocate attention to a problem by increasing the
benefits of attention allocation and reducing the
costs created by cognitive load and competitive
crowding. We test our hypotheses using field data
from a global engineering firm, in which organi-
zation members utilized an online discussion forum
to post problems and share solutions related to struc-
tural engineering—a core competence of the firm.
Our study contributes to conversations about how
attention is allocated inside organizations, with
broader implications for information processing in
social technology environments. By viewing atten-
tion allocation as a matching process, we bring
matching theory into the organization, and highlight
the theoretical importance of matches between par-
ticular knowledge providers and particular problems
for influencing what receives attention. Our attention
perspective sheds light on how knowledge sharing is
shaped by factors that influence the costs, as well as
the benefits, that providers can incur when allocating
attention to problems,while controlling for provider–
seeker relationships and other factors that may in-
fluence this activity. Examining the increasingly
pressing question of how attention is allocated in the
context of an online discussion forum also contrib-
utes to our understanding of online knowledge
sharing, a phenomenon of growing practical sig-
nificance within and across organizations. Per-
haps, at its core, the study helps to illuminate
a challenge of central importance to organizations:
understanding why some problems get solved,
while others do not.
ANATTENTION PERSPECTIVE ON KNOWLEDGE
SHARING
Knowledge Sharing in an Online Community
In large, dispersed organizations in which
knowledge is widely distributed, online communi-
ties often utilize social technology platforms, such
as discussion forums, to enable knowledge seekers
to access solutions to problems from knowledge
providers across the organization. By posting ques-
tions to an online discussion forum, individuals can
search beyond their own social networks, minimize
coordination costs, and receive answers from others
whom they did not know could offer them. For an
online discussion forum to function effectively,
however, voluntary participation from knowledge
providers is necessary.
Prior research on online knowledge sharing has
identified a variety of social motivations that may
lead knowledge providers to contribute solutions to
problems. For example, in an early study of advice
giving in a technical online community, Constant
and colleagues (1996) found that the benefits to
knowledge providers in a Fortune 100 company
seemed to arise primarily from the gratification of
helping colleagues and from the reputational en-
hancement gained by demonstrating expertise.
Wasko and Faraj (2005) found that members of
a legal professional association were more likely to
contribute to an online discussion forum if they felt
that they hadmore to share, anticipated reputational
benefits, and were structurally embedded in the
professional network. Chiu and colleagues (2006)
found that perceived norms of reciprocity, as well as
social ties and community identification, increased
the propensity to share knowledge in a professional
IT network in Taiwan. Other studies have found
evidence for effects of functional role and hierar-
chical status (Ahuja, Galletta, & Carley, 2003), user
experience and recognition (Jeppesen & Frederiksen,
2006), perceived identity verification (Ma &Agarwal,
2007), and self-efficacy (Hsu, Ju, Yen, & Chang,
2007). In the related context of electronic document
repositories, scholars have uncovered additional
factors that can affect contributions, ranging from
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individual self-worth to generalized trust, a cli-
mate of fairness, and organizational rewards (e.g.,
Bock et al., 2005; Kankanhalli et al., 2005). Taken
together, these studies suggest that a range of
motives lead individuals to contribute solutions to
problems.
However, much of this research examines general
propensities to contribute, rather than why specific
contributions are made. To the extent that previous
research on online knowledge sharing has focused
on dyadic exchanges rather than overall con-
tributions, it has assumed that contributions depend
on relationships between providers and seekers
(e.g., Constant et al., 1996). This focus on provider–
seeker relationships builds on research on knowl-
edge sharing through personal networks, which has
shown that providers are often more willing to share
knowledge with seekers to whom they feel personally
connected. A personal connection between a provider
and a seeker may arise from social similarity or
homophily, which encourages interaction between
individuals with similar demographic or social char-
acteristics (e.g., McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook,
2001; Reagans, 2005). It may come from physical
proximity, which exposes individuals to each other
and makes it easy for them to access each other (e.g.,
Allen, 1977; Cummings, 2004). It also may come from
prior familiarity, which establishesmutual knowledge
and expectations of ongoing reciprocity (e.g.,
Cramton, 2001; Espinosa et al., 2007). Yet research
on online knowledge sharing has shown that con-
tributions often occur in the absence of interpersonal
homophily, proximity, or familiarity (e.g., Constant
et al., 1996). Moreover, there is mixed evidence for
the importance of reciprocity in online knowledge
sharing, with some arguing that expectations of rec-
iprocity matter (e.g., Chiu et al., 2006; Walther,
Anderson, & Park, 1994), while others find that they
do not (e.g., Constant et al., 1996; Wasko & Faraj,
2005). The implication is that knowledge sharing in
an online discussion forum is driven by factors be-
yond provider–seeker relationships based on homo-
phily, proximity, familiarity, and reciprocity.
To shed new light on what these factors might be,
we take a different perspective from prior research by
viewing knowledge sharing in an online discussion
forum as driven by provider–problem matching,
rather than by provider–seeker relationships. In our
empirics, we account for the likelihood that a pro-
vider contributes to the forum at all as a precondition
for our analyses, and we also control for provider–
seeker relationships, but our theoretical arguments
and our main empirical analyses focus specifically
on a provider’s decision to allocate attention to
a particular problem. Below, we argue that this de-
cision is driven by the expertise match between the
provider and the problem, as well as by other prob-
lem characteristics and by problem crowding. Our
hypotheses are summarized in Figure 1.
Provider–Problem Expertise Matching
Prior research has shown that knowledge providers’
levels of expertise are important in influencing their
FIGURE 1
Model of Provider–Problem Attention Allocation in an Online Discussion Forum
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overall contributions to an online community. For
example, Constant et al. (1996) found that indi-
viduals with higher levels of expertise were more
likely to contribute answers to an online discus-
sion forum, and Wasko and Faraj (2000) confirmed
that individuals were less likely to contribute
answers when they felt that their expertise was
inadequate. These studies relied on self-reported
levels of expertise and overall contributions, and
did not examine either the content of the pro-
viders’ expertise or the content of the problems
to be addressed. Nevertheless, they suggest that
a provider who can offer expertise that more
closely matches the expertise required by a focal
problem will be more likely to decide to allocate
attention to that problem.
In part, providers whose expertise more closely
matches the expertise required by a problem may
see greater benefits in allocating attention to that
problem. These benefits may arise from the satis-
faction of helping others (e.g., Dudley & Cortina,
2008) or from the value that they anticipate creating
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998), as well as from the
prospect of enhancing their reputation or encour-
aging future reciprocity by using their expertise to
provide a good solution (e.g., Chiu et al., 2006;
Constant et al., 1996; Wasko & Faraj, 2000). To the
extent that such benefits are anticipated, they can be
expected to be greater when there is a closer match
between the content of provider’s expertise and the
content of the problem.
Additionally, providers whose expertise matches
a focal problem also face lower costs of attention
allocation. Closer expertise matching increases the
likelihood that the provider has the absorptive ca-
pacity necessary to understand the problem (Cohen
& Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002). Further,
evidence from geographically distributed teams
suggests that overlapping expertise enhances mu-
tual knowledge, reducing the costs of understanding
and responding to others’ problems (Kotha, George,
& Srikanth, 2013). This makes it quicker and easier
for the provider to make sense of the problem, to
grasp its intricacies, contingencies, and ramifications,
to situate it in a broader knowledge landscape, and to
identify and articulate a solution (Sole & Edmondson,
2002; Thomas, Sussman, & Henderson, 2001; Tsai,
2001). In contrast, potential knowledge providers
may find it more difficult to solve, or even to un-
derstand, a problem when the content of their ex-
pertise and the content of the problem are more
divergent, owing to their lower absorptive capacity
and the insularity of their knowledge base (George,
Kotha, & Zheng, 2008), making it more costly to
respond effectively.
Because a potential knowledge provider with
expertise that more closely matches a problem can
anticipate both greater benefits and lower costs from
allocating attention to that problem, we expect that
a closer expertise match will increase the likelihood
that a provider allocates attention to a problem in an
online discussion forum. Thus, as a baseline pre-
diction, we expect:
Hypothesis 1. The likelihood that a provider
allocates attention to a focal problem will be pos-
itively related to the closeness of the provider–
problem expertise match.
Problem Characteristics
Theories of selective attention suggest that a
problem is likely to attract attention if it is salient—that
is, if it stands out more relative to alternative tar-
gets for attention allocation (McArthur, 1981;
Taylor & Fiske, 1978). According to cognitive
psychologists, salience does not rely on prior
preferences for a particular kind of stimulus; in-
stead, attention is drawn selectively to a stimulus
on exposure (Higgins, 1996). The implication is
that the characteristics of a problem that make it
more salient can increase the likelihood that a po-
tential knowledge provider will allocate attention
to that problem.
In an online discussion forum, those character-
istics of a problem that can make it more salient for
a potential knowledge provider include its length,
breadth, and novelty. Longer problems take upmore
space on the screen, dominating a provider’s field of
vision and crowding out other stimuli (see Parkhurst,
Law, & Niebur, 2002; Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004). In
addition, once the potential knowledge provider
starts to read, longer problems may also be more
engaging, as the provider gets drawn into the details
of the situation presented in the problem. Broader
problems are more likely to touch on a domain of
expertise of interest to a provider, offering a hook
that captures the provider’s attention (see Cohen,
March, & Olsen, 1972; March 1994). For example,
a problem that mentions tennis, soccer, and base-
ball is more likely to attract attention than one that
mentions only tennis. Again, once the potential
knowledge provider starts to read, broader prob-
lems may also be more engaging as they connect
the domain of expertise that originally attracted the
provider to other domains of expertise. More novel
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problems can attract attention as a result of dis-
tinctiveness effects (e.g., Gardner, 1985; Nelson,
1979; Taylor & Fiske, 1978). Prior research has
shown that executives pay more attention to issues
that subordinates portray as more novel (Dutton,
Ashford, O’Neill, & Lawrence, 2001), and unfamiliar
terrains are more likely to capture search attention
during new product development (Li, Maggitti,
Smith, Tesluk, & Katila, 2013). Similarly, in an
online discussion forum, problems that are novel
relative to other problems are likely to stand out
more, and thus to attract attention. Additionally,
research on open-source software suggests that
tackling novel problems can be intrinsically moti-
vating, as well as extrinsically rewarding, since
solving them can serve as a reputation-enhancing
signal to the community (Lakhani & Wolf, 2005).
Some length, breadth, and novelty thus can help
to attract attention to a problem. At high levels,
however, length, breadth, and novelty can impose
costs on potential knowledge providers that may
reduce their propensity to allocate attention to
the problem. When a problem is high in length,
breadth, or novelty, it creates cognitive load for
a provider, in the form of nontrivial information-
processing demands (Sweller, 1988). This cogni-
tive load may result from intrinsic or extraneous
factors: intrinsic cognitive load is generated by the
problem’s inherent level of difficulty, while extra-
neous load is generated by the way in which it is
presented—for example describing a square in
writing imposes more extraneous load than pro-
viding a picture of a square (Chandler & Sweller,
1991; Paas, van Gog, & Sweller, 2010).
Long problems may generate greater intrinsic load
than short problems because they are inherently more
difficult, requiring a potential knowledge provider to
utilize more complex cognitive schemas to process
them. They may also create greater extraneous load
because they are wordier than necessary, perhaps be-
cause of an unfocused portrayal of the problem or an
unnecessarily detailed description, such that the pro-
vider needs to expend greater effort to understand the
question, to distil the essential information, and to
articulate a response. Broad problems are likely to
generate greater cognitive load than narrow problems
because they are likely to be inherently more difficult,
controlling for expertise matching, since they span
multiple domains of expertise, and thus require that
providers construct and utilize more complex sche-
mas to process them (Dane, 2010). Problems that are
novel for the forum likewise are likely to create greater
cognitive load than problems that are routine for
the forum, either because they are inherently more
difficult to address if the knowledge provider does not
possess the schemas needed to process them andmust
build them from scratch, or because even if the pro-
vider does possess the necessary schemas, the novelty
of the problem for the forum means that there is still
more work to be done to help others to understand the
solution than is needed for a routine problem (George
et al., 2008; Kotha et al., 2013). Thus problems with
high levels of length, breadth, or novelty impose
higher cognitive loads on potential knowledge pro-
viders, increasing the costs of allocating attention
to such problems. The consequence, as Kahneman
(1973: 53) pointed out, can be that “excessively com-
plex stimuli are treated as irrelevant noise and no
longer attract attention.”
In summary, a problem that is very short, narrow, or
routine can fail to attract attention from a potential
knowledge provider as a result of low salience, while
a problem that is very long, broad, or novel can be
offputting because of high cognitive load. Taken to-
gether, these arguments suggest that there will be
a curvilinear relationship between a problem’s length,
breadth, or novelty and a potential knowledge pro-
vider’s decision to allocate attention to that problem,
such that greater length, breadth, and noveltywill have
positive effects on the likelihood of attention alloca-
tion, but only up to a point, after which greater length,
breadth, and novelty will have negative effects on the
likelihood of attention allocation. Hence we propose:
Hypothesis 2. The likelihood that a provider
allocates attention to a focal problem will be
curvilinearly related to the problem’s (a) length,
(b) breadth, and (c) novelty, in an inverse U
shape.
Problem Crowding
While cognitive psychologists’ theories of selec-
tive attention suggest that the characteristics of
a problem itself are important for attention alloca-
tion, organizational scholars have proposed theories
of selective attention tailored to organizational set-
tings that suggest that the extent to which problems
attract attention will vary not only with the char-
acteristics of those problems themselves, but also
with the contexts within which the problems are
embedded (e.g., March & Olsen, 1976; Weick, 1979).
Ocasio (1997) calls this “the principle of situated
attention”—that is, what individuals focus on
depends on the particular situation or context in
which they find themselves (Ross & Nisbett, 1991).
2015 685Haas, Criscuolo, and George
In an online community’s discussion forum,
a central feature of the context that can be expected
to influence the allocation of attention to a focal
problem is problem crowding, in the form of the
number of other problems concurrently posted to
the forum (see Jones, David, & Rafaeli, 2004;
Piezunka & Dahlander, 2014). Theories of intra-
organizational ecology and competition for atten-
tion suggest that the full set of problems that are
seeking solutions can influence how individuals
allocate attention to specific problems within firms
(e.g., Burgelman, 1991; Hansen & Haas, 2001).
In an online discussion forum, concurrently posted
problems can increase the chances that a potential
knowledge provider decides to allocate attention to
a focal problem by increasing the salience of the
full set of problems and the forum overall. If more
problems are posted to the forum on a regular
basis, the activity on that forum generally will be
greater (see Butler, 2001; Markus, 1987). Potential
knowledge providers are more likely to be aware
that the forum is an active hub for knowledge
sharing, to monitor the forum’s postings on an
ongoing basis, and to take notice of announce-
ments about new postings. Additionally, they may
be more likely to assess the potential for benefits
such as reputation enhancement or future reci-
procity as greater if there is more activity on the
forum (see Chiu et al., 2006; Connolly & Thorn,
1990; Lin, Hung, & Chen, 2009). Whether because
a potential knowledge provider is more likely to
notice a focal problem or to assess the benefits of
responding to it as greater, the result is that more
concurrently posted problems can increase the
likelihood that the provider allocates attention to
the problem.
However, since attention is a finite resource, be-
yond some point a large number of concurrently
posted problems may reduce the likelihood that the
potential knowledge provider decides to allocate
attention to a focal problem. As March (2002: 27)
observed, “the attention devoted to a particular
[decision] by a particular potential participant
depends on alternative claims on attention.” It has
long been recognized that problems compete for
the attention of members (e.g., Cyert & March,
1963; Simon, 1947), with wide-ranging implica-
tions for decision making in organizations (e.g.,
Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Joseph & Ocasio, 2012;
Sullivan, 2010). The competition between prob-
lems has become increasingly acute as companies
have introduced new electronic platforms that
enable knowledge seekers to “push,” or broadcast,
their problems to hundreds or thousands of
potential knowledge providers at zero marginal
cost, simply by posting them to an organization’s
intranet or external website (Jeppesen & Lakhani,
2010; Shapiro & Varian, 1999). In an online forum,
a large number of concurrently posted problems
creates many alternative claims on a potential
knowledge provider’s finite attention. The resulting
competitive crowding increases the opportunity
costs of attending to a focal problem and thus may
decrease the likelihood that the provider decides to
allocate attention to that problem.
In summary, when there are few concurrently
posted problems, a focal problem can fail to attract
attention from a potential knowledge provider
owing to a general lack of interest in the forum.
Conversely, when there are many concurrently
posted problems, a focal problem can fail to attract
attention owing to the opportunity costs created
by competitive crowding. The implication is that
there will be a curvilinear relationship between
the number of concurrently posted problems and
the allocation of attention to a focal problem, such
that a larger number will have positive effects on
the likelihood of attention allocation up to a point,
after which a larger number will have a negative
effect on the likelihood of attention allocation.
Thus we predict:
Hypothesis 3. The likelihood that a provider
allocates attention to a focal problem will be
curvilinearly related to the number of concur-
rently posted problems, in an inverse U shape.
Moderating Effects of Provider–Problem Expertise
Matching
We have argued above that problem length,
breadth, and novelty, as well as the number of
concurrently posted problems, will influence the
likelihood that a potential knowledge provider
decides to allocate attention to a focal problem.
However, we expect that provider–problem ex-
pertise matching will positively moderate these
effects. In particular, we argue that closer exper-
tise matching will increase the likelihood that
a provider decides to allocate attention to a prob-
lem that is longer, broader, or more novel, or
which is competing with more concurrently posted
problems.
Closer expertise matching can increase the benefits
and decrease the costs of allocating attention to a
problem of greater length, breadth, or novelty. When
a problem is long, broad, or novel, the benefits of
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allocating attention to that problem will be greater for
potential knowledge providers who have expertise
that more closely matches the problem, because of
their greater ability to offer a response that can help
others and create real value, as well as possibly en-
hance their own reputation andelicit future reciprocity
(Chiu et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2009). Additionally, the
costs of allocating attention to a problem that is
long, broad, or novel are likely to be lower for a po-
tential knowledge provider who has expertise that
more closely matches the problem, since that pro-
vider will have greater absorptive capacity for the
problem, which reduces the costs involved in
managing the cognitive load created by length,
breadth, or novelty. For example, a provider with
more closely matching expertise will be able to sort
important from extraneous information in a long
problem and digest the important information
more efficiently, process the multiple domains of
expertise in a broad problem using appropriate
schemas more readily, or absorb a problem that is
novel for the forum and address that problem more
easily.
Closer expertise matching can also increase the
benefits and decrease the opportunity costs of
allocating attention to a problem when there are
more concurrently posted problems competing for
the provider’s attention. When there are many
concurrently posted problems, the benefits of
responding to a focal problem will be greater for
a provider who has expertise that more closely
matches the problem because that provider has
greater ability to offer a solution that can create
value, be reputation enhancing, and perhaps elicit
future reciprocity, compared with a provider who
has expertise that is less closely related to the
problem. Moreover, the costs of responding to the
focal problem will be lower for a provider who has
expertise that more closely matches the problem
because that provider’s time and effort will be more
productive as a result of his or her increased ca-
pacity to absorb the problem and to articulate a re-
sponse efficiently (Kotha et al., 2013). Since less
time and effort are required to respond to the
problem, the opportunity costs incurred by the
provider as a result of competitive crowding will be
reduced.
Taken together, these arguments suggest that the
benefits of allocating attention to a problem that is
long, broad, novel, or competing with more con-
currently posted problems will be greater when
there is a closer expertise match than when there
is a distant expertise match, and the costs of
allocating attention to that problem will be lower.
Accordingly, the inverted U-shaped curves that we
predicted for the main effects on attention alloca-
tion of problem length, breadth, and novelty, and
concurrently posted problems, can be expected to
demonstrate a steeper upward curvature and a flatter
downward curvature when expertise matching is
greater. Hence we predict:
Hypothesis 4. Expertise matching will posi-
tively moderate the curvilinear relationship
between the likelihood that a provider allo-
cates attention to a focal problem and the
problem’s (a) length, (b) breadth, and (c) nov-
elty, such that the positive slope of the inverted
U-shaped curve becomes steeper and the nega-
tive slope becomes flatter with increasing
closeness of the provider–problem expertise
match.
Hypothesis 5. Expertise matching will positively
moderate the curvilinear relationship between
the likelihood that a provider allocates attention
to a focal problem and the number of concur-
rently posted problems, such that the positive
slope of the inverted U-shaped curve becomes
steeper and the negative slope becomes flatter
with increasing closeness of the provider–problem
expertise match.
DATA AND METHOD
Research Setting
We tested the hypotheses using data collected at
one of the world’s leading multinational engineer-
ing consultancies. Headquartered in London, the
firm employs more than 10,000 full-time staff in 71
offices across 26 countries. It executes thousands
of projects annually, and is globally renowned for
creativity and innovative problem solving through
its work on landmark structures including the
Sydney Opera House and the 2008 Beijing Olym-
pics National Aquatic Center.
Knowledge sharing enabled engineers in this
firm to solve problems that arose from specific
client needs and which required them to figure out
ways of applying principles, past experience, and
existing practices in unique situations. To facilitate
knowledge sharing, the firm had invested heavily
in advanced information and knowledge manage-
ment systems, including online discussion forums,
as well as expert yellow pages and searchable
document repositories. These technology plat-
forms were supplemented by a range of human
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resources (HR) practices, such as mentoring, job
rotation, and experience sharing, as well as
by a strong knowledge-sharing culture in which
employees were willing to help each other. There
were no formal incentives for knowledge sharing,
however, and providing advice was not formally
rewarded by the appraisal system. Instead, as one
senior manager in the firm told us: “People are
expected to help . . . so the norm is contribution and
this is just the way things are.”
Data Collection
To facilitate knowledge sharing across the orga-
nization, the firm had established 25 electronic
communities of practice (eCOPs), each with its own
online discussion forum. These communities fo-
cused on different technical disciplines, including
structural engineering, fire engineering, environ-
mental consultancy, fluid dynamics, acoustics, etc.
Joining an eCOP required individuals to register
formally, and registered members received an
e-mail whenever a question was posted on the
community’s online discussion forum. Individuals
could belong to multiple eCOPs and could join or
leave any of these eCOPs with impunity. The mes-
sage threads of all of the online discussion forums
were accessible by all employees, whether or not
they were registered members of the eCOP, and
anyone in the firm could contribute to any forum by
posting questions and/or answers. The questions
and answers posted to a forum included the name
of the individuals posting them and their e-mail
addresses, but no other identifying information. The
system did not allow knowledge providers to auto-
matically access more detailed information on the
knowledge seekers. To obtain this information,
a provider would have to type the name of the
seeker into the search engine of the firm’s other
knowledge management systems.
We analyzed knowledge sharing in the structural
engineering community’s online discussion forum
over a 32-month period between January 2003 and
August 2005. Structural engineering is a fundamen-
tal discipline in construction and design projects.
The firm employed more than 1,000 structural
engineers, who accounted for 27% of its total engi-
neering staff. The structural engineering community
was the largest and most vibrant eCOP inside the
firm. Like the other 24 eCOPs, it was heavily sup-
ported by the organization, which provided funding
for video conferences, short courses, lunchtime
seminars, and other activities. In August 2005, the
structural engineering eCOP had 535 members, of
whom 73% were structural engineers, 6% were
bridge engineers, 6% were civil engineers, 3%
were facade engineers, and others specialized in
fields such as material sciences, geotechnical, and
infrastructure. The most common themes in the
problems that were posted to the structural engi-
neering eCOP’s online discussion forum focused on
appropriate structural elements, building regu-
lations, economic feasibility, numeric values, and
theoretical models and formulae. However, the
problems themselves were not titled, tagged, or
categorized into these (or other) themes when they
were posted. Some sample problems from the
online forum are presented in Table 1.
Data sources. We combined data from four
sources for this study. The first source was the
electronic logs of all of the messages posted to the
online discussion forum during the 32-month pe-
riod under analysis. Because the online discussion
forum was used as a vehicle to advertise some of the
activities organized by the structural engineering
community, such as seminars, workshops, or train-
ing courses, we read all of the 3,682 messages pos-
ted during our sample period and deleted those
messages that did not refer to an engineering prob-
lem. After this, the dataset included 3,421messages,
of which 952 were problems and 2,469 were
responses. Thus an average of almost 30 problems
and 77 responses were posted per month. These
messages were posted by 623 individuals, of whom
478 were knowledge providers (that is, posted at
least one response).
A second data source was the firm’s expert yellow
pages. Each member of the firm was encouraged to
provide a description of his or her areas of expertise
in a personal profile on the company intranet,
which could be accessed only by employees, and to
keep it updated. These expertise descriptions were
self-declared and voluntary. There was a strong in-
centive to provide an honest and accurate de-
scription, because this knowledge management
system was searchable and often used by staff to
identify experts in a particular area. Indeed, the
phrase prompting the expertise description stated
“what things I expect people to ring me up and
discuss.” Thus, while the descriptions were not of-
ficially screened for accuracy, an individual was
expected to be able to provide an answer to a col-
league if questioned about an area of technical ex-
pertise listed on his or her profile. Additionally, the
descriptions were reviewed annually as part of each
individual’s appraisal process, which meant that
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there was some formal, as well as informal, pressure
on staff not to “overdeclare” their expertise. About
two-thirds of the firm’s employees had completed
their expertise descriptions when we obtained this
dataset. These descriptions were 30 words long on
average, although some exceeded 250 words. They
provided rich information, as this typical example
demonstrates:
Structural issues related to reinforced/pre-stressed
and/or post tensioned concrete; flat slab/rib slab
design; in service behaviour including deflection
prediction, structural implications of shrinkage and
thermal effects, and the investigation of defect; 3D
steelwork package Xsteel and Raft design; structural
testing and monitoring including full scale testing of
hole cutting in a post-tensioned slab [56 words]
The third data source was records from the HR
department,which provided data on each employee’s
office location, rank, tenure, and gender. The
fourth source was the company’s project database,
from which we extracted lists of the projects on
which each individual had worked since joining
the firm.
Because of missing data across the four data
sources, some of the knowledge providers had to be
dropped from the dataset, reducing our final sample
to 307 knowledge providers (although our models
also account for individuals who could have served
as knowledge providers, but did not, as described
below). When we compared these 307 providers
with the 171 providers who were excluded because
of missing data, we found that those who were in-
cluded in our final sample posted significantly more
answers than those who were excluded (p , .01).
This is advantageous for our study in that we are
able to include a high proportion of responses that
were posted to the forum in the final sample even
TABLE 1
Sample Problems Posted on the Structural Engineering Forum
Problem type Sample post
Appropriate structural elements “We are undertaking a town center redevelopment and our client is looking to provide the
necessary car parking under the development. The site area is approx 30,000m2 (300m3 100m).
We have a couple of structural options for the deck supporting the development above the car
park. A ribbed RC slabs or a steel frame with precast planks. The grid is 16.2 3 7.4m with an
imposed load from the development of 30kN/m2. Does anyone know of a similar situation and
what solution was used for the deck over the car park?”
Building regulations “We are involved in the design of a football stadium in Scotland. The local building control
department has questioned the fact that we haven’t got any fire protection to the roof structure.
As the roof is not required for the overall stability of the structure, or to hold up any of the floors,
we considered that fire protection wasn’t required, as in a normal building structure. Has
anyone else who has been involved in stadium design had a similar query? Any comments
gratefully received.”
Economic feasibility “I am involved in a competition scheme for a housing block right next to a railway, and naturally
the architect is concerned about limiting vibration. I know that we have isolated concert halls
and the like. However I’m not sure if such measures would be cost-effective in a housing
context, and if so, what sort of technologies we might recommend. Any suggestions?”
Numeric values characterizing
structural elements
Three questions about shear head reinforcement in flat slabs:
1. “With traditional reinforcement (i.e., straight bars and shear links), what proportion of the
reinforcement average weight/square meter would people expect to be accounted for by the
shear links?”
2. “7.8m 3 7.8m grid, 300mm flat slab, imposed loads of around 5kPa—what average
reinforcement weight per square meter would people expect to see?”
3. “What is the best way of coping with punching shear around columns in flat slabs?”
Theoretical models and formulae “We are currently designing a number of high rise apartment blocks in masonry which exceed
4 stories. Walls are load bearing masonry with precast floors. We are currently designing the
buildings to Option 3 of Table 12 BS 5628 i.e., designed vertical and horizontal ties for
accidental damage. This is the Client’s preferred option. The horizontal ties are not a problem.
His preferred method of forming the vertical ties is to use a hollow block which is then in filled
with concrete. When you use the formula in Table 14 BS 5628 to calculate the tie force—for
a 150mm thick inner leaf with ties at 5m centers and a clear distance between floor restraints of
2.6m—it works out at approximately 1MN. This equates to approximately 5T25’s. I have looked
through the Masonry Designers Manual which comes up with 4T32’s in their example. The
values appear high. If anybody has used this method before and can provide any advice on
the above, I would be grateful.”
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though some individuals had to be dropped. In fact,
the sample of 307 knowledge providers was re-
sponsible for generating 76% of all of the responses
to engineering-related problems on the forum dur-
ing the period under analysis. After excluding
responses to problems posted by individuals with
missing data, our final sample included 1,974
messages, of which 639 were problems and 1,336
were responses.2
Statistical Approach
Because the focus of our theoretical arguments
is on whether a particular knowledge provider
decides to allocate attention to a particular prob-
lem in the forum, the unit of analysis in our main
econometric models is a provider–problem dyad.
We constructed a matrix of all provider–problem
dyads in which the ijth cell is 1 if provider i pro-
vided a response to problem j (realized dyad) or
0 if provider i did not provide an answer to prob-
lem j (nonrealized dyad). The providers in these
dyads included all of the 307 individuals who
posted at least one response during the observa-
tion period. We defined the risk set of problems to
include all possible problems that were available
to be answered at the time that a focal problem was
posted to the forum—that is, as all problems pos-
ted prior to the time when the focal problem was
posted (whether or not they received a response)
and which were still open at the time when the
focal problem was posted. We considered a prob-
lem to be still open if it was posted less than 50
days before the focal problem; we used this win-
dow because no problem in our dataset received
a response 50 days or more after it been posted.
The resulting dataset consisted of 376,670 possi-
ble provider–problem dyads, of which 1,336 were
coded 1 (realized dyads) and 375,334 were coded
0 (nonrealized dyads).
Constructing the dataset in this way enabled us to
compare realized dyads with nonrealized dyads, fol-
lowing the analytic approach taken in previous stud-
ies of tie formation between firms (e.g., Gulati, 1995).
However, the dataset was characterized by a pre-
ponderance of zeros resulting from the large number
of nonrealized dyads. The analysis of a dataset with
very few positive events (less than 1%) cannot be
undertaken using a standard logit model because it
will underestimate the probability of a positive
outcome—that is, a match between a provider and
a problem (King & Zeng, 2001). The dataset was also
characterized by nonindependence in the error
terms arising from the fact that both providers and
problems could appear many times in the dataset.
This issue of network autocorrelation could lead to
underestimation of standard errors (Krackhardt, 1988).
To address these concerns, we followed previous
studies of tie formation in sparse networks (e.g.,
Hallen, 2008; Jensen, 2003) by using a choice-based
sampling technique and testing our hypotheses using
a rare-event logit model. The choice-based sampling
technique included all of the realized dyads and
a randomly extracted sample of corresponding non-
realized dyads.
Consistent with our theoretical focus on why
a particular provider decides to allocate attention
to a particular problem rather than to other pos-
sible problems, for each realized dyad in which
provider i responded to a problem j, we randomly
selected 10 nonrealized dyads from the sample of
problems to which provider i could have respon-
ded, but did not (that is, those posted less than 50
days prior to the focal problem). To ensure that
enough problems had been posted prior to the fo-
cal problem to randomly extract the sample of 10
nonrealized dyads, we excluded problems posted
during the first two months of our observation
period, resulting in a final dataset with 13,761
dyads, of which 1,251 were realized dyads and
12,510 were nonrealized dyads.3
While this choice-based sampling technique re-
solves concerns created by a preponderance of zeros
in the dataset, it can bias the logit estimates because
2 It is possible that some responses to problems were
given directly to a seeker, bypassing the online forum.
However, our interviews with members of the firm, in-
cluding the head of knowledgemanagement, indicated that
participants were strongly encouraged to post their respon-
ses on the forum rather than to reply directly to a seeker, so
that others could search the forum for answers to their
questions. Indeed, seekers occasionally posted on the forum
answers that they had received over the phone from a pro-
vider for exactly that purpose. We also checked whether the
seeker had included a phone number or e-mail address at
the end of the question, which could indicate that a direct,
rather than public, response was desired, and found only
two instances of this in our sample of 639 problems. The
available evidence thus indicates that providers tended to
post their responses on the forum rather than to reply di-
rectly to seekers via e-mail or telephone.
3 We ran robustness tests with ratios of 1:5 and 1:3 re-
alized to nonrealized dyads, and found that they pro-
duced substantively equivalent results to those reported
here.
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the proportion of positive outcomes in the sample
is different from that in the underlying population
of potential dyads. To correct this bias, we used
weighted exogenous sampling maximum-likelihood
estimation (WESMLE), an approach that weights the
contribution of each dyad to the likelihood function
and is better than alternative approaches for large
samples (King & Zeng, 2001). Additionally, we
clustered the standard errors on the provider (Hallen,
2008; Jensen, 2003), since each provider appears in
one realized dyad and 10 nonrealized dyads (that is,
the provider is constant across 11 observations).4 We
used the ReLogit Stata procedure of Tomz (2003) to
estimate the logit models. Finally, we utilized the
longitudinal nature of the dataset by constructing the
explanatory and control variables to minimize re-
verse causality bymeasuring them in the period prior
to the focal match/nonmatch, as explained more
fully below.
Dependent Variable
Attention allocation. Our main dependent vari-
able is whether a provider decided to allocate atten-
tion to a problem posted on the structural engineering
community’s online discussion forum. We consid-
ered that provider i allocated attention to problem j
if he or she posted a response to problem j. Thus our
dependent variable (attention allocation) is a binary
variable that is equal to 1 if a possible provider–
problem match was realized, or 0 if that possible
match was not realized.
Explanatory Variables
Provider–problem expertise matching. To cap-
ture how close the expertise possessed by a provider
was to the expertise required by the problem, we
utilized a keyword similarity approach (Criscuolo,
Salter, & Sheehan, 2007). Specifically, our measure
of expertise matching was constructed by capturing
how similar the keywords in the provider’s exper-
tise description were to the keywords in the focal
problem.
To capture the universe of possible keywords and
how similar they were to each other, we began by
deriving a list of 574 keywords from the 3,948 ex-
pertise descriptions of all employees stored in the
company’s expert yellow pages.5 We used this list of
574 keywords to construct a keyword-by-keyword
similarity matrix (K) (574 3 574), the ijth cell of
which contains a measure of similarity between
keywords i and j. To derive this measure of simi-
larity, we used the Salton cosine formula:
cosineði;jÞ5 coocði:jÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ocðiÞ*ocðjÞ
p
where the nominator represents the co-occurrence
of each pair of keywords in the expertise descrip-
tions and the denominator is the product of the
square root of the respective occurrence frequen-
cies in all 3,948 expertise descriptions (see Aral &
Van Alstyne, 2011, for a similar application in the
context of e-mail exchanges). Pairs of keywords
that coappear very often have a cosine nearer to 1,
while keywords that rarely appear together have
a cosine nearer to 0. For example, the cosine value
for “foundation” and “pile” is 0.46, while the co-
sine between “foundation” and “vibration” is only
0.027.
We also used the list of 574 keywords to construct
a provider-by-keyword asymmetricmatrix (X) (3073
574), in which cell xij 5 1 if the ith provider men-
tioned keyword j in his or her expertise description,
and xij 5 0 otherwise. Similarly, we constructed
a problem-by-keyword asymmetric matrix (Y) (639
3 574), in which cell yij 5 1 if problem imentioned
keyword j, and yij 5 0 otherwise. We then multi-
plied the provider-by-keyword matrix (X) by the
keyword similarity matrix (K), and multiplied the
resulting matrix by the transposed problem-by-
keyword matrix (Y). By weighting by the keyword
similarity matrix, we were able to capture the extent
of similarity between the keywords in the provider’s
4 We also estimated models clustering the errors on the
problem, the knowledge seeker, and both the knowledge
provider and the knowledge seeker, and found results
consistent with those reported here.
5 In deriving this list of keywords, we disregarded arti-
cles, prepositions, adverbs, verbs, and words that did not
refer to technical expertise. We also classified word pairs,
such as “remote sensing” and “traffic calming,” and word
triplets such as “environmental impact assessment” and
“computational fluid dynamics,” as keywords. Addition-
ally, keywords were corrected for plurals and association,
e.g., “rail/railway,” “sustainable/sustainability,” “daylight/
light,” “cabling/cable,” and “forecasting/forecast.” (For an
application of this approach to the context of patent anal-
ysis, see Corrocher, Malerba, & Montobbio, 2007.) From
this list, we selected the 574 keywords that appeared more
than 10 times. We then presented this list to senior man-
agers to ensure that key areas of expertise were not missing,
and that the list of pairs and triplets of keywords did
identify particular areas of expertise.
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expertise and the keywords in the problem, even
when these keywords were not exactly the same. In
this way, we obtained a provider-by-problemmatrix
(W) (307 3 639), which contained in cell wij the
similarity between the keywords mentioned in the
expertise description of provider i and those men-
tioned in problem j. We then divided the value of
each wij cell by the product of the total number of
keywords in the expertise description of provider i
and the total number of keywords in problem j, to
restrict the range of this indicator between 0 and 1.
Problems that addressed areas of expertise more
similar to the expertise of the potential knowledge
provider have a higher value of this expertise
matching variable.
Problem characteristics. To measure problem
length, we counted the number of words in each
problem posted to the forum.
To measure problem breadth, we computed the
extent to which there was variety in the domains of
expertise addressed in the problem. To identify
the possible domains of expertise that could be
addressed, we again drew on the 574 keywords from
the company’s expert yellow pages. We carried out
a hierarchical clustering analysis on the keyword-
by-keyword matrix (K), applying the Ward method
with Euclidean distances. Using the stopping rule
of Duda and Hart (1973), we obtained 19 clusters of
keywords, which represented different domains of
expertise inside the company. This method allowed
us to classify the keywords that appeared in each
problem into one or more of these 19 domains of
expertise. We constructed the measure of problem
breadth using Teachman’s entropy index, a measure
of variety (see Harrison & Klein, 2007) determined
by the following formula:
problem  breadthi5 +
19
i51
pi3 ln

pi

where pi is the proportion of keywords in domain i.
Problems in which keywords are spread more
evenly across a higher number of expertise domains
have a higher value on this breadth measure.
Our measure of problem novelty captures how
different the focal problem is from problems pre-
viously posted to the forum, again using a keyword
similarity approach to derive the measure. Specifi-
cally, the measure was constructed by examining
how similar the keywords in the focal problem were
to the keywords in previously posted problems. To
capture how similar a particular problem was to
each previously posted problem, we multiplied the
problem-by-keyword matrix (Y) by the keyword
similaritymatrix (K), and thenmultiplied the resulting
matrix by the transposed problem-by-keyword
matrix (Y) to generate a problem-by-problem matrix
(Q), which contained in cell qij the similarity be-
tween the keywords in problem i and those in prob-
lem j. We then divided the value of each qij cell by the
product of the total number of keywords in problem i
and in problem j, to account for all of the possible
combinations of keywords in two given problems.
Finally, for each problem iwe calculated the average
similarity value between problem i and all of the
other problems previously posted on the forum (that
is, we excluded problems posted after the focal
problem), and computed the inverse of this average to
derive our problem novelty measure.6 Accordingly,
for a given problem i the problem novelty variable is
derived using the following formula:
problem  noveltyi5
1
+Jj51
qij
kw*i kwj
j
where J is the number of problems previously posted
on the forum.
Thus a problem that contains keyword combina-
tions that differ from the keyword combinations in
previously posted problems will score highly on
this novelty measure. By construction, problems
posted at the beginning of our observation period
will tend to display lower values on this measure
than problems posted towards the end of the period.
To address this issue, we included month and year
dummies in our models that account for the timing
of the problems.7
Problem crowding. We constructed a measure
of concurrent problems that is equal to the number
of problems posted on the forum in the three
working days prior to the focal problem being pos-
ted. We chose a window of three working days be-
cause close to 90% of the problems in our dataset
were answered within this time frame. We ran ro-
bustness checks with different windows, including
five, seven, and 10 working days, and obtained
similar results.
6 Consistent results were also obtained with a problem
novelty measure built using all 639 problems posted to the
forum during our observation period, including those
posted before, as well as after, the focal problem.
7 We also reran our analyses after dropping the first six
months of observations, and the results did not change.
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Control Variables
We included several sets of variables to control
for alternative explanations for attention allocation
in the online discussion forum. First, we included
a series of variables to account for characteristics of
the provider–seeker dyad. To control for reciprocity
(that is, the possibility that a provider might be more
likely to respond to a problem posted by a seeker
who had previously assisted him or her), we used
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the focal provider
had previously received a response to a problem
from the focal seeker, or 0 otherwise. To control for
homophily (that is, the possibility that a provider
might be more likely to respond to a problem posted
by a seeker who shares similar personal character-
istics), we created a dummy variable (same gender)
equal to 1 if both individuals in a dyad were of the
same gender, or 0 otherwise.8 To control for prox-
imity (that is, the possibility that a provider might be
more likely to respond to a problem posted by
a seeker in the same location), we included a dummy
variable (shared office) equal to 1 if two individuals
worked in the same office, or 0 otherwise. To control
for familiarity (that is, the possibility that a pro-
vider might be more likely to respond to a problem
posted by a seeker whom he or she knew), we in-
cluded two variables: a dummy variable (shared
projects) equal to 1 if two individuals had worked
together on a project during the five years pre-
ceding the date on which the problem was posted
on the forum, or 0 otherwise; and a count variable
(shared communities) that captures the number of
other online communities in which the provider
and seeker were both members, since this could
have enabled them to get to know each other
through interactions on other online discussion
forums, as well as through other community-related
activities, such as video conferences, seminars, and
training sessions.
Second, we included a series of variables to ac-
count for characteristics of the seeker that might lead
a provider to allocate attention to a problem posted
by that seeker. We controlled for the seeker’s rank in
the company using HR data that classified each
individual’s hierarchical level on a nine-point scale
(1 5 junior consultant, 9 5 director), to capture the
possibility that a provider might be more likely to
allocate attention to a problem posted by a seeker
with higher rank in the company. We included
a dummy variable (seeker member) equal to 1 if the
seeker was a member of the structural engineering
community, or 0 otherwise, since a provider might
have felt more motivated to respond to a problem
posted by a seeker who was more invested in the
forum. We also included a dummy variable (seeker
facilitator) equal to 1 if the seeker was one of the
formal facilitators in the online discussion forum, or
0 otherwise. These formal facilitators were subject
matter experts responsible for stimulating technical
discussions and maintaining an active discussion fo-
rum; given their central role in the community,
problems posted by themmight have beenmore likely
to attract the attention of a knowledge provider.
Third, we accounted for characteristics of the
provider that might have influenced his or her de-
cision to allocate attention to a particular problem.
We controlled for the provider’s rank and the
provider’s tenure in the organization. Individuals in
higher positions in the company and/or with longer
tenure might have had a greater depth of expertise
in particular areas, which could have increased
their propensity to respond to problems in those
areas. We also controlled for the number of projects
(logged) to which a provider was assigned at the
time that the problem was posted to the forum
(provider project load), because a provider who was
working on more projects at the time a problem was
posted to the forum might have been less likely to
allocate attention to that problem as a result of his or
her higher project load.
Fourth, to account for the possibility that a par-
ticular provider was not the first to respond to
a problem, we included a control variable (response
order) for the order of his or her response (that is,
first, second, third, etc.). We expected a provider to
be less likely to respond to a problem if others had
already responded. We constructed this variable by
setting its value equal to the actual order of the re-
sponse for a problem to which a provider respon-
ded; for a problem to which a provider could have
responded, but did not, we randomly assigned
a value to this variable, so that its distribution
among the nonrealized dyads corresponded to that
among the realized dyads.
8 We would have collected information on other de-
mographic characteristics, such as age, race, or national-
ity, if it had been possible, but we were constrained by
laws that restricted the use of such information. However,
while we intuitively expected that gender might matter in
an online discussion forum, because it is often apparent
from participants’ names, these other demographic char-
acteristics are less likely to matter significantly; in support
of this assumption, prior research has shown limited roles
for their effects in online knowledge sharing (Constant
et al., 1996).
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Fifth, we included dummy variables for years,
months, and days of the week in our models to ac-
count for any otherwise unobserved tendency of
knowledge providers to allocate attention to prob-
lems posted at different times.
Controlling for Selection Bias
Consistent with the focus of our theoretical argu-
ments onwhy a particular provider chooses to allocate
attention to a particular problem rather than to other
possible problems in the online discussion forum, our
main rare-event logit analyses focus on the 307 indi-
viduals who posted at least one response to a problem
on the forum during our observation period. However,
restricting our analysis to only those individuals who
acted as knowledge providers creates a possible se-
lection bias, because individuals who post responses
to problems may systematically differ from individu-
als who do not post responses. To account for this
possible bias, we used the two-stage procedure pro-
posed by Heckman (1976). In our context, this in-
volved estimating a first-stage probit model to predict
whether an individual posted at least one response to
any problem on the forum during the observation pe-
riod (the “selection model”). From this, we derived an
inverse Mills’ ratio, which we then included in our
main rare-event logit model (the “outcome model”).
The sample used in the selectionmodel included all
399 individuals who were active on the forum during
the observation period, whether as knowledge pro-
viders, knowledge seekers, or both, plus all 214 mem-
bersof thestructural engineeringcommunitywhowere
not active on the forum during the observation period
and for whomwe had complete data, for a total risk set
of 613 individuals.9 The dependent variable (knowl-
edge provider) was equal to 1 if an individual posted
a response on the forum at any point during the ob-
servation period, or 0 otherwise. As independent var-
iables, we included a series of characteristics that we
expectedmight have influencedwhether an individual
was a knowledge provider. Individuals who were
formal forum facilitators of the forum may have been
more likely to respond to problems posted on the fo-
rum as part of their responsibilities. Individuals who
were members of the structural engineering (focal)
community may have had a greater sense of commit-
ment to the community and thus have been more
likely to respond to problems, while individuals who
weremembers of (more) other communitiesmay have
had a greater underlying propensity to share knowl-
edge and to help others by posting responses. Gender
might have affected the probability of knowledge
provision too, so we included a dummy variable that
was equal to 1 for male and 0 for female. Individuals
in higher positions in the company (rank) were often
expert problem solvers and may have been more able
to respond to problems on the forum as a result, while
individuals who had worked in the company for
a longer period (tenure) had more work experience
that could be shared with others on the forum. Indi-
viduals who had expertise in a larger number of en-
gineering domains (expertise breadth) may have
been more likely to have the relevant knowledge to
respond to problems on the forum; we calculated
this variable following the procedure used to derive
the problem breadth variable. Similarly, individuals
who specialized in structural engineering (struc-
tural engineer) may have had a greater propensity to
respond to problems on the forum. Finally, indi-
viduals who were assigned to more projects during
the observation period may have been less likely to
respond to problems posted on the forum as a result
of their higher project load, so we included a logged
measure of total project assignments in the model
(total project load).10
9 We also ran the first-stage model using as a risk set all
individuals who were active in the forum during our ob-
servation period plus all structural engineers in the com-
pany. This risk set includes 955 individuals, of whom 543
did not participate in the forum. For this larger risk set, we
do not have information on gender and project load for all
individuals. Since both of these variables are significant
in the current model, we have chosen to estimate our first-
stage model using the smaller sample. The results do not
change with the larger risk set.
10 To apply the Heckman two-stage procedure, we need at
least one instrumental variable that is expected to influence
the selection process, i.e., whether an individual acts as
knowledge provider, but is not expected to influence the
likelihood that an individual allocates attention to a partic-
ular problem rather than to other problems. We used the
following four variables as instruments: forum facilitator,
member of focal community,member of other communities,
and gender. We included rank and tenure in both the first-
stage model and our main models, since these variables
could be expected to influence both the selection and the
outcome equations. We replaced expertise breadth and
structural engineer with our expertise-matching measure in
the main models, since this measure more accurately cap-
tures how expertise might affect a provider’s decision to
allocate attention to a particular problem (the results are not
changed by including them too). We also replaced total
project load with the measure that captures the provider’s
project load at the time that the focal problem was posted.
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RESULTS
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the
variables used in the models. We standardized the
main continuous independent variables by sub-
tracting the mean and dividing by the standard de-
viation, in order to avoid high correlations between
these variables and their interaction terms (Neter,
Wasserman, & Kutner, 1990). Most of the correlation
coefficients are low. Nevertheless, we derived vari-
ance inflated factors (VIF) for our models; these
were on average less than 2.5, indicating that mul-
ticollinearity is not a concern in the regressions.
The first-stage probit model predicting whether or
not an individual acted as a knowledge provider
(not shown) indicated that individuals were more
likely to post at least one response on the online
discussion forum during the observation period if
they were higher ranked in the company (b 5 .11,
p , .01), were male (b 5 .30, p , .01), had broader
expertise (b 5 .31, p , .01), were structural engi-
neers (b 5 .21, p , .05), and—contrary to our
expectations—had a higher project load (b 5 .20,
p , .05). The other variables included in the model
did not have significant effects.
The results of our main rare-event logit models
are shown in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 reports the
estimates for the main effects predicted by Hy-
potheses 1, 2, and 3. Model 1 is a baseline model
that includes only the control variables. This model
indicates that reciprocity was a positive and signif-
icant predictor of the probability that a particular
provider allocated attention to a particular problem.
However, we did not find any significant effects for
homophily based on gender, proximity based on
shared office, or familiarity based on shared projects
or shared communities. Similarly, none of the
seeker characteristics seemed to explain why a pro-
vider decided to allocate attention to a problem. Of
the provider characteristics, rank had a positive and
significant effect in the model with control variables
only, but this effect is not significant in subsequent
models. Conversely, project load is not significant
in the model with control variables only, but this
variable is negative and significant in subsequent
models, indicating that providers were less likely to
allocate attention to a focal problem if they were
assigned to more projects at the time that the prob-
lem was posted. The inverse Mills’ ratio is not sig-
nificant, indicating that selection bias was not
a major concern in our dataset.
Model 2 shows the results for Hypothesis 1,
which predicted that a provider will be more likely
to respond to a problem that more closely matches
his or her expertise. This hypothesis is supported:
we find a positive and significant relationship be-
tween expertise matching and the decision to allo-
cate attention to a given problem (b 5 .17, p , .01).
Models 3, 4, and 5 add the problem length, breadth,
and novelty variables in order to test Hypotheses 2a,
2b, and 2c, which predicted curvilinear relation-
ships between each of these three problem charac-
teristics and the likelihood that a provider decides
to allocate attention to the problem. The predictions
are supported for all three variables, as shown by the
signs and significance of the coefficient estimates. In
Model 3, we find a positive and significant co-
efficient for the problem length variable (b 5 .15,
p , .01), and a negative and significant coefficient
for the squared term (b 5 –.08, p , .01). In Model 4,
the coefficient for the problem breadth variable is
also positive and significant (b 5 .64, p , .01), and
its squared term is negative and significant (b5 –.31,
p, .01). The same pattern is found inModel 4 for the
problem novelty variable, which has a positive and
significant linear effect (b 5 .10, p , .05), and
a negative and significant squared term (b 5 –.03,
p , .05). The inflection points for all three inverted
U-shaped curves are within the observed range of
these variables. These results hold in Model 6, in
which the variables are included together. Hence
we conclude that there is strong support for
Hypothesis 2.
In Model 7, we introduce the linear and squared
terms for the competing problems variable in order
to test Hypothesis 3, which predicted that the
number of concurrently posted problems has a cur-
vilinear relationship with the likelihood that a pro-
vider decides to allocate attention to a focal problem.
In partial support of Hypothesis 3, we find that the
linear term has the predicted positive and signifi-
cant effect on the likelihood of attention allocation
(b 5 .11, p , .01). However, the squared term is not
negative and significant, as we had predicted; in-
stead, it is positive and nonsignificant. The finding
of a positive linear effect of the number of compet-
ing problems holds in Model 8, in which the non-
significant squared term is excluded, indicating that
the likelihood that a provider allocated attention to
a focal problem was greater if a higher number of
other problems were posted to the forum concur-
rently, and did not decline as the number of con-
currently posted problems reached higher levels.
Thus the support for Hypothesis 3 is mixed.
To test Hypotheses 4 and 5, the moderating effects
of expertise matching on problem characteristics
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TABLE 3
Rare Event Logit Model Estimations for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Reciprocity 2.29*** 2.28*** 2.23*** 2.29*** 2.29*** 2.25*** 2.27*** 2.25***
(0.51) (0.52) (0.54) (0.55) (0.53) (0.56) (0.57) (0.57)
Same gender 0.04 0.01 20.00 20.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Shared office 20.06 20.05 20.05 20.05 20.05 20.05 20.05 20.05
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
Shared communities 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Shared projects 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Seeker rank 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Seeker member 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Seeker facilitator 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.15
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
Provider rank 0.02** 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Provider tenure 20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Provider project load 20.01 20.04** 20.04** 20.04** 20.04** 20.04** 20.04** 20.04**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Response order 20.02 20.02 20.02 20.02 20.02 20.02 20.02 20.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Expertise matchinga 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Problem lengtha 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Problem length^2 20.08*** 20.07*** 20.07*** 20.07***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Problem breadtha 0.64*** 0.47*** 0.46** 0.44**
(0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Problem breadth^2 20.31*** 20.27*** 20.26** 20.25**
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Problem noveltya 0.10** 0.10* 0.09* 0.09*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Problem novelty^2 20.03** 20.02** 20.02** 20.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Competing problemsa 0.11*** 0.13***
(0.04) (0.03)
Competing problems^2 0.02
(0.02)
Inverse Mills’ ratio 0.09 20.02 20.03 20.03 20.01 20.03 20.02 20.02
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Constant 25.30*** 25.15*** 25.08*** 25.38*** 25.05*** 25.18*** 25.04*** 24.93***
(0.49) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (0.50) (0.51) (0.54) (0.51)
Log-likelihood 24136.35 24090.10 24083.70 24084.90 24084.65 24076.15 24068.70 24069.10
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by providers in parentheses; year, month, and day of the week dummies included; DV 5 attention
allocation to a focal problem; n 5 13,761.
a Variable standardized by subtracting the mean from the value and dividing by the standard deviation.
* Significant at p , .10
** Significant at p , .05
*** Significant at p , .01
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and problem crowding are presented in Table 4, in
Models 9–14 and 15–16, respectively. As these
models show, we find linear-by-linear interactions,
but not curvilinear-by-linear interactions, between
expertise matching and each of the variables captur-
ing problem characteristics and problem crowding—
that is, there are significant interactions with the
linear terms, but not the squared terms, for these
variables. Model 17 presents a full model that
includes the interactions for the squared terms,
while Model 18 reports the full model in which we
excluded these higher-order interaction terms. Be-
cause the interactions for the squared terms are not
significant in the partial models, we assess the
support for our moderating hypotheses using Model
18 (see Aiken & West, 1991).
Model 18 shows a positive and significant in-
teraction term between expertise matching and
problem length (b 5 .07, p, .10): the likelihood that
a provider allocated attention to a longer problem
was greater if that provider had expertise that more
closely fit the expertise required by that problem.
The interaction between expertise matching and
problem breadth is also positive and significant (b 5
.10, p , .05), indicating that the likelihood that
a provider allocated attention to a broader problem
was higher if that provider had expertise that
more closely matched that required by the prob-
lem. Similarly, expertise matching positively and
significantly moderates the relationship between
problem novelty and attention allocation (b 5
.10, p , .01). We also find that the interaction
term between expertise matching and competing
problems (b 5 .06, p , .05) is positive and sig-
nificant, indicating that the likelihood that
a provider allocated attention to a focal problem
while facing a higher number of concurrently
posted problems was greater if that provider’s
expertise matched the expertise called for by the
problem.
Notably, although there are no significant inter-
actions for the squared terms, it is still possible that
the negative slopes of the curvilinear main effects
may become flatter with increasing closeness of
the provider–problem expertise match. To see
this, consider the derivative for a linear-by-linear
interaction in a simple linear model, Y 5b1X 1
b2X
21b3Z1b4XZ, where X is problem length and
Z is expertise matching. The derivative, dY/dX 5
b11 2b2X 1b4Z, shows that the slope of the curve
is a function of both X and Z—that is, both the
upward-sloping and downward-sloping parts of the
curve are affected by Z (see Aiken & West, 1991, for
further explication).11 In order to establish whether
expertise matching significantly affects both the
positive and the negative slopes of the curvilinear
main effects in our models, therefore, we must plot
the interaction terms and also examine the differ-
ences in the predicted probabilities of attention
allocation associated with different values of the
expertise matching variable.
We used the estimates from Model 18 to plot the
interaction terms. Since the magnitude, direction,
and statistical significance of moderating effects
depend on the values of all of the other independent
variables in nonlinear models (Hoetker, 2007), and
statistical testing of these effects can produce mis-
leading results (Greene, 2010), we follow the sug-
gestion of Greene (2010) and assess the evidence for
Hypotheses 4 and 5 by inspecting these plots. To
generate the plots, we derived the predicted proba-
bilities of attention allocation at three levels of the
moderator variable (expertise matching) over the
entire observed range of the moderated variable
(e.g., problem length), while holding all other con-
tinuous explanatory variables at their means and
significant binary variables at 1. We used 1SD below
and above the mean of the expertise matching var-
iable for the low and high values, respectively, and
the mean for the medium value.
The plots for the predicted probabilities for the
moderating effects of expertise matching on prob-
lem length, breadth, and novelty are presented in
Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c. These figures show that
a provider was less likely to allocate attention to
a problem that was longer, broader, or more novel if
the match in expertise between that provider and
the problemwas low; however, a provider was more
likely to allocate attention to such a problem if the
level of expertise matching was high (that is, the
curves shift upward as expertise matching increa-
ses). All three figures also indicate that an increase
in expertise matching shifts the maximum of the
inverted U-shaped curves toward the right, as il-
lustrated by the vertical dotted lines, suggesting
that a closer expertise match increases the point at
11 Had we found curvilinear-by-linear interactions too,
such that Y5b1X1b2X
21b3Z1b4XZ1b5X
2Z, the de-
rivative, dY/dX 5b112b2X 1b4Z1 2b5XZ, would have
shown that the slope of the curve was a function of X, Z,
and X*Z. In this case, the slopes of the curve could have
changed in additional ways, possibly even to the extent
that the inverse U-shaped curve might switch to a U shape
for some values of Z. (See, e.g., Van Der Vegt & Bunderson,
2005, in the context of a linear model.)
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FIGURE 2
Moderating Effect of Expertise Matching on the Relationship between the Likelihood of Attention Allocation to
a Problem and (A) the Length of a Problem (B) the Breadth of a Problem (C) the Novelty of a Problem (D) the
number of Competing Problems.
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which the costs of allocating attention to a focal
problem outweigh the benefits for a knowledge
provider.12
To further examine whether both the positive
slopes and the negative slopes of the curves are sig-
nificantly affected by expertise matching, we plotted
the differences in predicted probabilities associated
with a change in expertise matching from low to
medium to high values, and then plotted these dif-
ferences in predicted probabilities against each of
the three moderated variables (plots not shown). If
expertise matching has the effect of steepening the
positive slopes, as well as flattening the negative
slopes, of the curves, we would expect to see these
differences increase across the entire range of the
moderated variables. The plot corresponding to
Figure 2a revealed that the differences in predicted
probabilities increased to the left of the maximum of
the inverted U-shaped curve only for length, in-
dicating that an increase in expertise matching
steepened the positive slope of the curve, but did not
flatten its negative slope. In contrast, the plots cor-
responding to Figures 2b and 2c revealed that the
differences in predicted probabilities increased
across the entire range of the inverted U-shaped
curves for both breadth and novelty, indicating that
an increase in expertise matching steepened the
positive slopes and also flattened the negative slopes
of these curves. Thus we find partial support for the
moderating effects of expertise matching on problem
length predicted in Hypothesis 4a, and full support
for the moderating effects of expertise matching on
problem breadth and problem novelty predicted in
Hypotheses 4b and 4c.
Finally, we plot the predicted probabilities for the
moderating effects of expertise matching on the
competing problems variable in Figure 2d. This
figure shows that providers were more likely to al-
locate attention to the focal problem when there
were more other problems concurrently posted on
the forum and that this effect was amplified at
higher levels of expertise matching. Deriving and
plotting the differences in predicted probabilities for
low, medium, and high levels of expertise matching
confirmed that the moderating effects of expertise
matching were positive across the full range of the
competing problems variable.13 Thus, with the ca-
veat that we did not find a curvilinear main effect for
competing problems, Hypothesis 5 is supported,
since the effects of competing problems are signifi-
cantly positively moderated by expertise matching.
Supplementary Analysis
Our hypotheses and empirical analyses focus on
a knowledge provider’s decision to allocate attention
to a particular problem. However, once a knowledge
provider has decided to allocate attention to a prob-
lem, the amount of time and effort that the provider
allocates to that problem may vary—that is, there
may be variation in attention intensity (Kahneman,
1973; Ocasio, 2011). Our data enable us to examine
this in a very preliminary way, by examining the
length of the response to a focal problem.
Using the sample of 1,251 problems that received
at least one response, we estimated double random
effects models that regressed the length of the
responses (logged) against the same variables used
in our main rare-event logit models.14 We included
the original inverse Mills’ ratio derived from the
first-stage probit model in which we predicted the
likelihood that a provider gave at least one response,
12 We also derived the confidence intervals for the dif-
ferences in predicted probabilities using a simulation-
based procedure (King, Tomz, &Wittenberg, 2000; Zelner,
2009). Although these confidence intervals need to be
interpreted with considerable caution (Greene, 2010), we
found that the differences in predicted probabilities as-
sociated with a change in expertise matching from low to
medium to high values were statistically significant (p ,
.05) for the entire range for each of the three moderated
variables (i.e., the confidence intervals around them never
contained 0), indicating that the upward shifts of the U-
shaped curves were significant. Additionally, we tested
whether the rightward shifts of the curves’ maxima in-
dicated by the vertical dotted lines were significant. For
problem length, we found that the shift in the maximum
was significant for the change from low to medium values
of expertise matching, but not for the change from me-
dium to high values; for both problem breadth and prob-
lem novelty, the shift in the maxima was significant for
the changes from low to medium, as well as medium to
high, values of expertise matching (i.e., the confidence
intervals for these maxima did not overlap).
13 Again, using a simulation-based procedure to cal-
culate the confidence intervals indicated that this mod-
erating effect of expertise matching was statistically
significant.
14 This specification corrects for the possibility of
underestimated standard errors owing to multiple
appearances of the same provider and problem in the
dataset (see, e.g., Reagans, 2011). Our main rare-event
models use clustering instead because an extension of the
double random effects approach to such models does not
currently exist.
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as well as a second inverse Mills’ ratio derived from
an additional first-stage probit model in which we
predicted the likelihood that a problem received at
least one response.15 Thus we controlled for selection
bias arising from those individuals who provided at
least one response to a problem, as well as from those
problems that received at least one response.
Estimates from these models (not shown) indicate
that expertisematching had a positive and significant
impact on the length of a provider’s response to
a problem (b 5 .07, p , .01). The estimates for the
linear terms of problem length, breadth, and novelty
were all positive and significant (respectively: b 5
.14, p, .01; b5 .10, p, .10; b5 .09, p, .01), but the
effects for the square terms were negative and sig-
nificant for problem novelty only (b5 –.03, p, .10).
The estimates for competing problems were non-
significant for either the linear or the squared term.
There was evidence of a positive and significant
moderating effect of expertise matching for problem
length (b 5 .06, p , .05), but not for any of the other
variables. In addition, response order had a positive
and significant effect (b 5 .05, p , .01), indicating
that providers gave longer responses to problems that
had received more other responses already, and
shared projects had a negative and significant effect
(b 5 –.12, p , .05), indicating that providers gave
shorter responses to problems posted by seekers with
whom they had worked previously. Taken together,
these preliminary results suggest that some of the
factors that influence the initial decision of whether
to allocate attention to a problem also influence how
much attention to allocate subsequently, but the
initial decision seems to involve more complex
considerations of the benefits and costs of attention
allocation; once the commitment is made to allocate
some attention to a problem, the costs of allocating
more attention seem generally less important.
DISCUSSION
As information demands on managers explode
with the growth and spread of social technologies,
there is a pressing need for clear explanations of
why managers allocate attention to specific prob-
lems in digital environments. Our study shifts the
scholarly debate from discussions of knowledge
provider–seeker relationships (based on relational,
social, and reputational rationales) to knowledge
provider–problem matches (based on expertise fit,
problem characteristics, and problem crowding).
Our findings support our central claim that the
features of a particular provider–problem match
influence attention allocation in an online discus-
sion forum. Below, we address their implications
for theories of managerial attention, matching pro-
cesses, and knowledge sharing in online commu-
nities, as well as for our understanding of how social
technology platforms are used in organizations.
Attention Allocation as a Matching Process
While prior theories of attention allocation in
organizations have offered valuable perspectives on
how individuals allocate their attention to prob-
lems, they have not focused on how particular
individuals allocate attention to particular prob-
lems. According to the attention-based view of the
firm, for example, the attention of organization
members is channeled in some directions and away
from others by structural features of organizations
such as rules, resources, and relationships (Ocasio,
1997). Relatedly, theories of issue selling emphasize
how organization members make deliberate efforts
to promote particular problems as worthy of each
other’s attention (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). Viewing
attention allocation as a matching process advances
such theories by emphasizing the inherently dyadic
nature of this activity andmoving beyond a focus on
what determines the set of problems that is available
for attention allocation to examine how particular
individuals allocate attention among the particular
problems within that set.
In viewing attention allocation as a matching
process between providers and problems, our study
is among the first to bring matching theory inside
organizations. Originally developed by Becker
(1973), matching theory was initially used to ex-
plain the formation of marriage partnerships, and
subsequently applied to employee–employer match-
ing in labor markets (e.g., Jovanovic, 1979). More re-
cently, it has been extended to an array of matches
in interorganizational contexts, including between
venture capitalists and startups (Sorensen, 2007),
potential alliance partners (Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009),
entrepreneurs and potentially valuable contacts
15 This second selection model included all of the
seeker characteristics in the main outcome models, as
well as the variables for problem characteristics and
problem crowding. As instrumental variables, we used
month and day of the week dummies, based on the as-
sumption that the timing of when a focal problem was
posted on the forum would affect the likelihood that it
received a response, but not the length of the response that
it received.
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(Vissa, 2011), and firms and research scientists
(Mindruta, 2013). We extend matching theory into
the intraorganizational context by examining how
matching processes occur within a firm, as part of
the daily activities of the organization members.
Additionally, while prior research on matching
theory has focused on matches between two actors
(e.g., employer and employee, or potential alli-
ance partners), we focus on matches between
actors and issues—that is, on why individuals al-
locate attention to particular problems and not
others.
One of the core insights of matching theory is that
the complementarity between the resources or
capabilities of potential partners increases the like-
lihood of a match (e.g., Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009;
Vissa, 2011). Consistent with this insight, our find-
ings show that greater similarity between the ex-
pertise possessed by a provider and the expertise
required by the problem increased the likelihood of
attention allocation in the online discussion forum
that we studied. Furthermore, we found that ex-
pertise matching positively moderated the effects of
problem length, breadth, and novelty (although it
did not increase the likelihood of attention alloca-
tion to very long problems). We also found that ex-
pertise matching positively moderated the effects of
problem crowding, such that an increase in the
number of concurrently posted problems was more
likely to result in increased attention to the focal
problem if the expertise match between the provider
and the problem was greater. Thus viewing atten-
tion allocation as a matching process leads us to-
ward new ways of understanding why organization
members pay attention to some problems and not
others.
At What Cost? An Attention Perspective on
Knowledge Sharing
Knowledge sharing remains the cornerstone for
explanations of how firms leverage the diverse,
distributed expertise of their employees to create
value and distinguish themselves from competitors
(Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1996). Scholars have
made considerable efforts to understand with greater
precision how the processes of knowledge sharing
unfold within firms (e.g., Argote et al., 2003; Hansen,
1999; Quigley et al., 2007; Reagans & McEvily, 2003;
Szulanski, 1996). However, among the broader
activities to which organization members can al-
locate attention, knowledge sharing is often viewed
as a peripheral activity (Brown & Duguid, 1991;
Lave & Wenger, 1991). This is particularly the case
in the context of social technology platforms such as
online discussion forums, in which participation is
voluntary and often seen as organizational citizen-
ship behavior (Constant et al., 1996; Wasko & Faraj,
2005). In such a context, factors that make it difficult
for a knowledge provider to respond to a problem
may well crowd out benevolent motivations or the
benefits that the provider anticipates from con-
tributing. Our attention perspective on knowledge
sharing illuminates such factors by suggesting that
knowledge providers take the costs of attention al-
location, as well as the benefits, into account in
deciding whether or not to respond to particular
problems.
In particular, our attention perspective suggests
that these costs and benefits will be influenced
by the characteristics of a problem itself, as well as
by problem crowding. As predicted, our results
revealed that problems that were longer, broader, or
more novel were more likely to attract attention
from a potential knowledge provider—but only up
to a point, after which greater length, breadth, or
novelty decreased the likelihood of receiving at-
tention. These findings are consistent with our ar-
gument that the cognitive load created by a problem
that is very long, broad, or novel creates costs
for a provider that can outweigh the benefits of
these characteristics for attracting attention to the
problem.
We expected to find that a higher number of
concurrently posted problems would have a similar
curvilinear effect on the likelihood of attention al-
location to a focal problem, but did not find evi-
dence for this; instead, we found only a positive
effect. One possible reason is that the numbers
of concurrently posted problems were not high
enough in our dataset for a negative effect of com-
petitive crowding to set in. We ran follow-up anal-
yses extending the window for posting other
problems from three working days to five, seven, or
10 working days prior to the focal problem, but still
found only positive effects. However, when we used
the seven- or 10-day windows and also considered
only those focal problems with 10 or more com-
peting problems, we found evidence of an inverted
U-shaped relationship between the number of
competing problems and the likelihood that a pro-
vider allocated attention to a focal problem. This
suggests that we did not find evidence of such
a curvilinear effect in our main models because the
maximum value of our concurrent problems variable
(12) was below the threshold at which competitive
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crowding reduces the likelihood that attention is
allocated to a focal problem.
One additional provocative finding, although a
preliminary one, concerned the effects of provider
project load. Contrary to our expectations, the first-
stage selection model indicated that individuals
who were assigned to more projects in total during
the observation period were actually more likely,
rather than less likely, to allocate attention to
responding to problems on the online discussion
forum. This may have been because such individ-
uals were somehow more able or more willing to
manage involvement in a wider array of work-
related activities. However, consistent with our
expectations, our main outcome models showed
that a knowledge provider who had a higher project
load at the time that a focal problem was posted was
less likely to allocate attention to that problem, in-
dicating that the opportunity cost of responding to
a problem was higher for such an individual. The
implication of these results is that attention alloca-
tion is influenced by a provider’s attention capacity
(see Simon, 1957)—that is, how much attention
he or she is able to allocate—in complex ways
that are worthy of further exploration in future
research.
Taken together, these findings extend theories
of knowledge sharing by heeding the call for
researchers to pay more “attention to attention”
(Ocasio, 2011), and specifically by considering how
both the costs and the benefits of allocating atten-
tion to a particular problem can influence a poten-
tial provider’s inclination to share his or her
knowledge. While much prior research on knowl-
edge sharing has noted that knowledge seekers face
costs, as well as benefits, when trying to secure
solutions to their problems through network ties or
electronic databases (e.g., Hansen & Haas, 2001;
Teece, 1977; Zander & Kogut, 1995), our study
breaks new ground by considering the costs, as well
as the benefits, that knowledge providers face when
allocating their scarce attention to providing such
solutions.
Online Knowledge Sharing in Organizations
Our study also aims to contribute to an emerging
body of research that specifically focuses on online
knowledge sharing in organizations, via social
technology platforms such as corporate intranets or
databases (e.g., Faraj, Jarvenpaa, & Majchrzak, 2011;
Fulk, Heino, Flanagin,Monge, &Bar, 2004; Kankanhalli
et al., 2005). In interpersonal contexts, people
sometimes choose to withhold their knowledge
from others who request it, for practical, strategic, or
political reasons (e.g., Connelly, Zweig, Webster, &
Trougakos, 2012; Haas & Park, 2010). In online
communities, it is even easier to withhold knowl-
edge, since the knowledge seeker does not approach
the knowledge provider directly, and thus there is
little risk of violating norms or incurring repercus-
sions. For this reason, social technology platforms that
are intended to facilitate knowledge sharing are often
plagued by collective action problems that deter
individuals from contributing their knowledge (e.g.,
Ba, Stallaert, & Whinston, 2001; Cabrera & Cabrera,
2002; Connolly & Thorn, 1990). Moreover, once they
decide to engage in online knowledge sharing, our
study shows that knowledge providers make system-
atic choices about the focus of their contributions that
are driven by different considerations from those that
drive interpersonal knowledge sharing.
Specifically, much of the increasingly extensive
literature on interpersonal knowledge sharing in
organizations emphasizes the role of personal con-
nections in facilitating exchanges between individ-
uals, usually through social network ties (e.g.,
Hansen, 1999; Levin & Cross, 2004; Reagans &
McEvily, 2003; Tortoriello & Krackhardt, 2010).
However, the control variables in our models in-
dicated that even where actual or potential personal
connections between providers and seekers existed,
as a result of social similarity, physical proximity, or
prior familiarity, these considerations did not in-
crease the likelihood of attention allocation; the only
form of connection that mattered in our study was
reciprocity. Other studies have found similarly weak
evidence for the influence of personal connections
in online communities (e.g., Constant et al., 1996).
Indeed, the attraction for many organizations of
technology platforms such as online discussion
forums lies in their ability to facilitate knowledge
sharing even in the absence of personal connections
between organization members. Yet our under-
standing of what drives knowledge sharing in such
online settings has been limited. In light of this, our
study aims to advance research on online knowledge
sharing by shifting the focus away from provider–
seeker relationships toward provider–problem
matching instead, and thus offers insights into how
a closer provider–problem expertise match, as well
as other characteristics of the problem and problem
crowding, influences the likelihood that a provider
allocates attention to that problem.
For research on knowledge sharing in organi-
zations, as well as on interpersonal communication
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and social networks more broadly, there are two
notable implications of this shift. First, social net-
work theory has called for more focus on the content
of ties, because what is transferred through a tie
might influence the choice of partners (Chua,
Ingram, & Morris, 2008; Podolny & Baron, 1997). By
showing that provider–problem expertise matching
influences whether an exchange takes place be-
tween a provider and a seeker in an online com-
munity, our study heeds this call and highlights the
importance of the expertise to be transferred
through a tie in determining the activation of that
tie. A second implication is that not everything that
can be analyzed as a social network necessarily
should be analyzed as such. While a provider–
problem matrix derived from an online discussion
forum can be readily converted into a network of
ties between knowledge providers and knowledge
seekers, the lack of social context in an online set-
ting limits the fruitfulness of this approach. That
said, the more the user interface of an online dis-
cussion forum or similar social technology platform
is structured in a way that makes social features
salient, the more we might expect social network
variables to matter for how the platform is used.
Thus if an online discussion forum were to be
designed in a way that makes the characteristics of
its knowledge seekers highly salient to its knowl-
edge providers, for example by requiring seekers to
post their photos or locations with their questions,
factors such as social similarity or physical prox-
imity might drive knowledge sharing more than we
observed in a setting in which these characteristics
were not highly salient.
Future Directions
Our study of knowledge sharing in an online
discussion forum illuminates how knowledge pro-
viders decide whether or not to allocate their at-
tention to particular problems. The study has its
limitations, however, which suggest some potential
avenues for future research. The first relates to the
generalizability of our results, given that we focus
on a single professional services organization. Al-
though we have a large sample of individuals, and
a considerable amount of information about them,
we must look to future research to establish the ex-
tent to which our findings reflect the particular
features of the organization, or alternatively reveal
more general patterns. For example, the firm stud-
ied has many employees dispersed around the
world and a large number of online discussion
forums. Thus it could be that this is an organization
in which employees are more selective about which
problems they choose to address than might be
the case, for example, in a smaller organization in
which there is more pressure to participate, in
which an online discussion forum is a relatively
novel and exciting technology, or in which con-
tributing knowledge by responding to problems is
viewed as a way in which to signal status.
Second, in focusing on the matching process be-
tween knowledge providers and problems, we lim-
ited our scope to studying whether a provider
posted a response to a problem on the online dis-
cussion forum. In our supplementary analysis, we
also examined how much attention they allocated,
as measured by the length of their response. How-
ever, we recognize that this supplementary analysis
is more suggestive than definitive, since longer
responses may or may not actually take more time
and effort to formulate than shorter answers. Using
additional measures and exploring the distinctive
drivers of attention intensity more fully would
therefore be a valuable direction for future research.
Moreover, our data did not allow us to evaluate the
quality of the responses provided to a problem.
Further research could usefully examine the impact
of provider–problem expertise matching, problem
characteristics, and problem crowding on the qual-
ity of online knowledge sharing, perhaps in a re-
search setting in which knowledge providers are
rated by their colleagues on the helpfulness of their
online contributions. Finally, in focusing on why
providers allocate attention to particular problems in
an online discussion forum, we have not addressed
the question of why knowledge seekers post prob-
lems to the forum in the first place, whether certain
types of individual are more likely to post problems
than others, or whether certain types of problem are
more likely to be posted. These would also be useful
directions for future research.
In conclusion, this study offers fresh insights into
online knowledge sharing in organizations by ex-
amining why individuals choose to allocate attention
to specific problems. From a knowledge manage-
ment perspective, social technology platforms such
as online discussion forums are valuable tools for
facilitating knowledge sharing among globally dis-
persed employees. However, the ability of organi-
zations to realize the full potential of these tools is
limited by the attention that their members choose
to devote to providing solutions to each other’s
problems. By viewing attention allocation in an
online discussion forum as a matching process
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between providers and problems, this study adds to
current debates on how knowledge is shared within
organizations, especially in the increasingly im-
portant online context.
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